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Abstract  
What drives processes of institution building within regional international 
organizations? We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of 
institutionalized cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as 
independent phenomena whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal 
factors. Developing the basic premise of ‘diffusion theory’ — meaning that decision-
making is interdependent across organizations — we argue that institutional pioneers, 
and specifically the European Union, shape regional institution-building processes in 
a number of discernible ways. We then hypothesize two pathways — active and 
passive — of European Union influence, and stipulate an endogenous capacity for 
institutional change as a key scope condition for their operation. Drawing on a new 
and original data set on the institutional design of 34 regional international 
organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article finds that: (1) both the 
intensity of a regional international organization’s structured interaction with the 
European Union (active influence) and the European Union’s own level of delegation 
(passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation within other 
regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence exerts a 
larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; and (3) 
these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that are 
based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings 
indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European 
Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international 
organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are 
insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts.  
Keywords  
Delegation, diffusion, institutional change, institutional design, regional international 
organizations, regionalism   
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Introduction1 
In 2000, African heads of state strengthened the main framework for institutionalized 
cooperation on the continent by replacing the Organization of African Unity with the 
African Union. This transition marked a significant evolution towards more powerful 
regional institutions, resembling those of the European Union (EU). The creation of a 
Commission with a codified right to initiate legislation and to bring infringement 
cases to a new African Court of Justice or Pan-African Parliament led many observers 
to comment on the apparent ‘organisational mirroring’ occurring between the two 
bodies (Haastrup, 2013: 789). 
This episode poses an important theoretical question: Which factors drive 
processes of institution building within regional international organizations (RIOs)? 
And more specifically: What role does the EU play in them? Most theories of 
regionalism, and of international cooperation more broadly, are ill equipped to capture 
such ‘outside-in’ influences because they locate the main drivers of institution 
building within each respective region. They view institutions primarily as reflecting 
the processes and structures of a given region, ones that operate from the ‘inside-out’. 
Dominant functional theories of cooperation – such as neofunctionalism (Haas, 1961), 
(liberal) intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) and neoliberal institutionalism 
(Keohane, 1984; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001) – view RIOs primarily as a 
response to conflicts or problems of collective action resulting from economic or 
                                                
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International Studies Conference in New Orleans, 
February 2015, the German Political Science Association Conference, September 2015, and at 
seminars or workshops at Oxford University, the European University Institute and the Social Science 
Research Centre Berlin. We thank the participants at these events, and especially Carlos Closa, Dan 
Drezner, Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, Liesbet Hooghe, Joe Jupille, Hanspeter Kriesi, David Lake, Miklos 
Lazar, Mikael Madsen, Gary Marks, Walter Mattli, Olivia Nicol, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Philippe 
Schmitter, Gerald Schneider, Jack Seddon, Duncan Snidal, Jonas Tallberg, Erik Voeten, Konstantin 
Vössing, Michael Zürn as well as the editors and reviewers for comments. We also thank Lennard Alke, 
Pia Noethlichs and Antonia Schlude for excellent research assistance. Tobias Lenz acknowledges 
support from the European Research Council Advanced Grant #249543 “Causes and Consequences 
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security-related interdependence within a particular region. As patterns of 
interdependence shift, organizations change their form.  
Similarly, constructivist or transactionalist approaches emphasize the role of 
communication and collective identities (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Deutsch, 1957; 
Katzenstein, 2005). They posit that organizations develop in response to changing 
social processes and structures. Taken together, these benchmark studies see factors 
endogenous to the region as being the drivers of institution building. As a recent 
review of two key works on the subject perceptively notes: ‘Neither volume tells us 
much about interregional flows […] or about emulation and learning, including the 
demonstration effects of one type of regionalism on another’ (Acharya, 2007: 637). 
With their focus on intraregional influences, most such studies treat, in sum, different 
RIOs as atomistic entities that develop largely independently of each other. 
We challenge this widespread assumption in the literature on regionalism by 
developing a diffusion account of EU influence on other RIOs, then subjecting it to 
the first systematic large-N analysis thereof. We build on a growing body of research 
in Comparative Politics and International Relations, which posits that units of analysis 
– be they policies, national institutions or international organizations – need to be 
conceived of as affecting each other (Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Grigorescu, 2010; 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). Institutional choices in some organizations 
systematically shape institutional choices in others. Diffusion studies thus analyse 
how ‘decisions in one country [are] influenced […] by the ideas, norms, and policies 
displayed or even promoted by other countries and international organizations’ 
(Gilardi, 2012: 453). 
Developing this premise, we posit that the most prominent institutional 
pioneer in regionalism, the EU, systematically affects the institutional evolution of 
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RIOs in other parts of the world; we furthermore identify the conditions under which 
it does so. Arguments about EU diffusion – although occurring under different labels 
– are longstanding. Early scholars of regionalism acknowledged, but failed to analyse 
systematically, the possibility of interregional influences (Haas, 1961). Today, claims 
about the influence that the EU ‘model’ has are commonplace in the literature on 
regionalism. Fioramonti und Mattheis suggest, for example, that ‘there is little doubt 
that the proactive role played by EU institutions to support regionalism has led to a 
“diffusion” of norms and institutional models’ (2015: 1). However none of these such 
works present clear propositions about EU influence, nor do they systematically test 
for its effects. A growing body of case-study work demonstrates such diffusion 
processes between the EU and other RIOs (Jetschke, 2009; Lenz, 2012; Rüland, 2014). 
A recent special issue on the topic confidently claims that the impact of EU diffusion 
is ‘certainly not spurious’ (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 194). While this literature has 
provided empirically convincing evidence that EU diffusion does indeed affect other 
RIOs in some cases, the external validity of these claims remains uncertain at present. 
Moreover, while we have an emerging sense of the mechanisms that underlie EU 
influence, our knowledge about the conditions under which it is likely to matter is 
limited. 
This paper offers the first systematic attempt to gauge the effects of the EU on 
other RIOs, by drawing on a new and original dataset that measures variation in the 
institutional design of 34 such organizations on an annual basis in the period from 
1950 to 2010. Institutional design has not only become a vibrant field of study in 
International Relations (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001), but evidence is also 
accumulating that design matters for substantive outcomes in world politics 
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(Koremenos, 2016).2 It is also widely seen as one of the most important ‘objects’ of 
EU influence. Even though EU influence might affect other aspects of regional 
integration – such as a counterpart’s policy portfolio, the development of their 
economic integration process or their democratic interventions (Gray, 2014b; Jupille, 
Jolliff and Wojcik, 2013) – formal institutions are nonetheless a key dimension of 
external influence. The EU’s active promotion of regionalism indeed specifically 
seeks to strengthen regional institutions. Simultaneously, the bulk of the literature 
concerned with processes of emulation of the EU also examines formal institutions.  
We draw on the diffusion literature to theorize two pathways of EU influence: 
first, its active promotion of regional institution building through financial incentives 
and structured interaction (active influence), and, second, its provision of institutional 
designs that serve as a reference point for policymakers in RIOs elsewhere (passive 
influence). We use prominent diffusion mechanisms as heuristic devices to theorize 
these two pathways, but our goal is not to adjudicate between different causal 
mechanisms. Recent research shows that such attempts have proven difficult in 
quantitative research, due to the difficulty to match indicators and concepts – and to 
deal with the problem that distinct mechanisms ‘are often interrelated’ empirically 
(Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2013: 695; Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016).  
Therefore our analysis focuses rather on delineating and measuring the 
conditions under which the two identified general pathways of EU influence are likely 
to matter, and to assess their relative explanatory power. We also hypothesize that an 
endogenous capacity for institutional change in RIOs – contractual incompleteness – 
                                                
2 The relationship between design and actual cooperation in RIOs is ambiguous, and requires more 
systematic study. For contending views see Haftel (2013) and Gray (2014a), who emphasize 
implementation gaps, and Alter (2014), who shows that institutional design makes a difference to 
cooperative outcomes. 
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conditions EU influence. Using fixed effects panel estimation techniques, our results 
show that: (1) both the intensity of an RIO’s structured interaction with the EU (active 
influence) and the EU’s own level of delegation (passive influence) are correlated 
with the level of delegation within other RIOs; (2) passive EU influence exerts a 
larger overall substantive effect than active EU influence does; and, (3) these effects 
are strongest among those RIOs that are based on founding contracts containing open-
ended commitments. 
Ultimately, our findings suggest that the creation and subsequent institutional 
evolution of the EU has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in RIOs 
elsewhere; counterfactually, member states would have delegated less power to 
independent regional institutions in the absence of the EU. From this perspective, the 
analysis indicates that most existing theories of regionalism are incomplete because 
they neglect the interdependence that exists between different RIOs – and specifically 
the direct and indirect interactions occurring between prominent institutional pioneers 
and other regional organizations. More broadly, the analysis (re-)emphasizes two 
important insights that have been lost from view in many of the recent quantitative 
studies of diffusion: namely that organizational pioneers are important providers of 
institutional designs for other RIOs and that diffusion processes are often 
hierarchically structured. 
The paper proceeds in four further parts. In the next one we present our theory 
and hypotheses. Then, we operationalize the key variables and describe the data to be 
used in the analysis. The third part regards our estimation techniques and results. A 
final part concludes, and discusses the argument’s theoretical implications.  
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Theory and hypotheses 
This paper examines the argument that the EU systematically conditions processes of 
institution building within other RIOs. We first theorize two pathways of EU 
influence, drawing on the analytical distinction between active and passive forms 
thereof, before turning to the conditions under which they are likely to become salient 
within a particular organization.  
 
Pathways of EU influence 
The first pathway captures the EU’s active influence on other RIOs. Here, EU 
influence is the result of activities consciously designed by a range of EU actors – 
being aimed at actively shaping institution-building processes elsewhere. Supporting 
regional integration has been a declared goal of the EU ever since the early 1970s.3 
Apart from a few global powers and selective ‘strategic partners’ with which it has 
started to engage in the last decade or so, the Community regularly deals with non-
member countries on a group-to-group basis rather than bilaterally. Over time, it has 
developed a holistic policy to support institution building within many RIOs that 
includes technical and financial assistance, the negotiation of cooperation and trade 
agreements as well as political dialogue. This support is a distinctive feature of the 
EU’s external relations, and it is driven by a self-interested desire to generate 
economies of scale in foreign markets (Robles, 2008) – as well as constituting an 
attempt to ‘lay down an identity marker’ (Grugel, 2004: 621). 
One way in which the EU’s active support affects institutional evolution 
                                                
3 For the sake of brevity, we use the acronym EU to refer to both today’s EU as well as its predecessors.  
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within other RIOs is through the incentives offered. Through direct engagement, the 
EU may change ‘the relative size of payoffs associated with [institutional] alternatives’ 
(Braun and Gilardi, 2006: 310; see also, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). 
Sociological institutional scholars refer to this mechanism as ‘coercive isomorphism’, 
defined as ‘both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other 
organizations upon which they are dependent’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150). 
The EU applies pressure through both financial incentives and institutional 
engagement. Financial incentives can be both positive – the strengthening of regional 
institutions can result from a desire to attract EU funding – and negative – meaning 
institutional change is the result of a desire to avoid existing resources being 
withdrawn (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Even though the EU does not tie 
the provision of financial support directly to particular types of institutional change 
occurring, financial dependence on the EU can powerfully affect institution-building 
processes. Moreover, the institutional engagement of the EU with other RIOs may 
induce institutional feedback effects – a key insight of the literature on institutional 
overlap and regime complexity, as well as of that on organizations (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Gómez-Mera, 2015). Structured interaction with the EU requires 
counterparts to create mechanisms for such coordination, which may have, in turn, 
knock-on effects for institution building in the RIO in question itself. 
The case-study literature provides evidence for the existence of this 
mechanism. EU threats to withdraw funding have previously provided a powerful 
impetus for institutional reform in SADC, an organization that is highly dependent on 
external donor funding. When the EU and other donors (mainly EU member states) 
considered shifting their financial support to other RIOs in the mid-1990s, this ‘threat’ 
catalysed an organizational restructuring that entailed, inter alia, a strengthening of 
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the Secretariat and the establishment of a European Court of Justice-type SADC 
Tribunal (Lenz, 2012: 163–64, 166; Gray, 2014b). 
Another way in which active EU influence affects regional institution building 
elsewhere is through ‘socialization’, which can be defined as a ‘process of interaction 
that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt 
coercion’ (Checkel, 2001: 562). Relying on instrumental and constructivist 
assumptions, direct interaction between actors creates channels for communication 
that provide opportunities for teaching and persuasion (for an overview, see Checkel, 
2005). Through interaction with the EU, RIO policymakers receive relevant 
information not only about what (and how) institutions work in the EU but also about 
salient institutional developments in the process of European integration. Most 
immediately, such interaction might help problematize the institutional status quo in 
an RIO – as well as frame the way in which the problem is understood, and what 
potential solutions to it might look like (Duina and Lenz, 2016; Finnemore, 1993). 
Over time, such interaction may further lead to the generation of common knowledge 
about ‘good’ institutional solutions to particular problems (Grobe, 2010). Research 
into bounded rationality and decisionmaking has shown that policymakers often learn 
from information that is readily available (Meseguer, 2006), a condition that 
opportunities for direct communication positively affect. Similarly, socialization 
research shows that the intensity and duration of contact crucially shapes the extent of 
adoption of new ideas about cause and effect (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Checkel, 
2005).  
The literature has documented a wide degree of EU diffusion in the realm of 
regional courts (see Alter, 2012). The creation of the Andean Court of Justice in 1979, 
modelled on the European Court of Justice, is a pertinent example of active EU 
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influence that occurred ‘not as a result of direct pressure from or financial linkages to 
the EU’ (Gray, 2014b: 19). Instead, networks of Andean and EU experts in the legal 
realms, which served as settings for learning and persuasion, played a key role in the 
aforementioned institution’s establishment. Saldías (2013) offers a detailed account of 
how personal connections between EU legal experts and influential consultants as 
well as officials in the Andean region led to a change in their beliefs about cause–
effect relationships regarding effective legal systems within economic integration 
schemes.  
Even though theoretically distinct, the incentive- and socialization-based 
mechanisms of EU influence often operate together in real-world situations. Thus, we 
treat them as complementary and mutually reinforcing ways by which active EU 
engagement with other RIOs affects the latter’s institutional evolution, suggesting the 
following testable proposition: 
Hypothesis 1 (Active EU influence): The more extensive active EU 
engagement with other RIOs is, the more likely they are, ceteris paribus, to 
develop stronger regional institutions. 
 
The second pathway captures the EU’s passive influence on other RIOs. The 
EU is the most successful pioneer of institutionalized economic cooperation between 
neighbouring countries in the post-Second World War era. This pathway, then, 
captures the idea that EU influence stems from the success and attractiveness of its 
institutional designs. 
One way in which the EU’s own institutional evolution shapes regional 
institution building elsewhere is through learning. Learning as a mechanism of 
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diffusion is concerned with information about the effects generated by the 
institutional choices of others, and often by those that pioneer them (Gilardi, 2012; 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006; Simmons and Elkins, 2004). As institutional 
innovations start to take effect, they allow other policymakers to gauge whether they 
are successful in generating the desired outcomes. Familiarity and success are thus 
key conditions for learning. As Ovodenko and Keohane note, ‘institutional designs 
that are familiar and perceived by a wide variety of participants in negotiations as 
successful in relevant contexts should have greater chances of being adopted’ (2012: 
523). Moreover diffusion is facilitated by theorization, whereby cause–effect 
relationships derived from a specific experience become theorized as being generally 
applicable. By abstracting from the specificity of the context in which desirable 
effects are initially generated, theorization suggests that ‘similar practices can be 
adopted by all members of a theoretically defined population, with similar effect’ 
(Strang and Meyer, 1993: 496). Institutional pioneers, then, may shape 
decisionmaking abroad by providing new information that others can learn from. 
From this perspective, the EU’s own institutional evolution can be expected to 
have affected regional institution building elsewhere. Many policymakers in other 
regions are familiar with EU institutions. Recent research on outside perceptions of 
the EU indicates that political elites in countries involved in regional integration 
processes view the EU not only as successful but also as highly relevant to their own 
efforts (Chaban, Holland and Ryan, 2009). As EU institutions evolve, the information 
derived from the EU experience is likely to also evolve. Similarly, the EU is the most 
theorized RIO, and such theorization is also likely to evolve over time – tracking the 
EU’s own institutional development. For instance, the widely recognized insight that 
allowing individuals to access regional courts is key to the effectiveness of a regional 
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legal system could only develop after individuals had started to regularly use the EU 
one; this took decades to emerge, and was a connection forcefully established by 
Alter’s work (for an overview, see Alter, 2014). In this vein, Jetschke and Murray 
(2012) detail in a case study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
how learning from the EU shaped the former’s institutional reform process in the 
2000s. 
Emulation is another way in which institutional pioneers might passively 
affect institutional evolution elsewhere. This phenomenon is concerned with the 
social construction of appropriate behaviour, and can be defined as a process whereby 
‘actors model their behaviour on the examples provided by others’ (Lee and Strang, 
2006: 889). As organizational fields become structured through associational 
processes, they develop standards for the legitimate institutional forms that 
organizations gradually adopt in an attempt to enhance their legitimacy – and 
ultimately their chances of long-term survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Institutional pioneers are particularly likely to be emulated, given the premium that 
exists in organizational fields for appearing similar in structural form to the most 
admired and successful organizations (Haveman, 1993). Drastic change in one such 
organization can, therefore, induce similar change in other organizations. As Weyland 
notes for the sources of domestic policy change, ‘drastic change in one country often 
prompts emulation efforts in other nations by calling attention to problems and 
offering ideas for solutions’ (2008: 290). 
From this perspective, the EU’s own institutional evolution can be expected to 
have affected regional institution building elsewhere. The EU is widely seen as ‘the 
most advanced model of regional integration [in the world]’ (Jetschke and Murray, 
2012: 185). Hence, it is plausible to posit that the EU is the main exemplar among 
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those RIOs whose behaviour is likely to be emulated by others. EU institutions might 
not only provide boilerplate solutions to given problems, but institutional change in 
the EU may also alert regional policymakers to the urgency of addressing certain 
problems inherent in regional integration in the first place (Duina and Lenz, 2016). It 
should be noted that positing emulation as a mechanism of EU influence does not 
necessarily imply that the wholesale adoption of EU designs by other RIOs is a given. 
It is also conceivable that individual member states emulate such models, and put 
them forth as a bargaining position in the course of institutional negotiations. To the 
extent that bargaining outcomes reflect more than lowest-common-denominator 
decisions – an assumption that appears reasonable under conditions of iterative 
bargaining and geographic ‘lock-in’ – then such emulation would nudge the overall 
outcome towards the emergence of stronger regional institutions. 
Processes of institutional emulation of the EU are well documented in the 
case-study literature. In a recent article on the ASEAN, Rüland suggests that it 
‘mimicked European structures of interest representation’ in the 1970s in an attempt 
to regain legitimacy and enhance the organization’s survival prospects (2014: 246). 
Similarly, Jetschke (2009) portrays ASEAN as an ‘isomorphic institution’ that has 
continuously emulated EU institutions as a way to enhance its legitimacy. She 
demonstrates a striking temporal coincidence between institutional change in the EU 
and similar institutional changes in ASEAN, which is suggestive of a form of passive 
EU influence – occurring due to ASEAN’s desire to appear legitimate in the eyes of 
important both internal and external audiences.  
These arguments lead to a second hypothesis concerning the EU’s passive 
influence on other RIOs: 
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Hypothesis 2 (Passive EU influence): As the EU enhances its institutional 
authority over time, other RIOs are, ceteris paribus, more likely to build 
stronger regional institutions.  
 
Scope condition of EU influence 
Under what conditions are the identified two pathways likely to become salient in 
affecting processes of institution building beyond the EU’s borders? Diffusion studies 
conventionally treat internal determinants of institutional and policy change as mere 
controls, or null hypotheses, to demonstrate that diffusion does indeed matter 
(Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). Nevertheless, most diffusion scholars 
recognize that these two sets of factors often interact in generating outcomes. Lee and 
Strang state, for example, that ‘international influences are integrally connected to 
national politics’ (2006: 888), while Checkel argues that ‘domestic politics – in 
particular, institutional and historical contexts – delimit the causal role of [norm 
diffusion through] persuasion/social learning’ (2001: 553).  
Recent research has sought to model this interaction (Grigorescu 2010). The 
theoretical reason for such internal–external interplay is well established, and has 
been succinctly stated by early scholars of the ‘second image reversed’ perspective. 
As Gourevitch notes, even compelling external pressures ‘are unlikely to be fully 
determining, save for the case of outright occupation. Some leeway of response to 
pressure is always possible, at least conceptually’ (1978: 911). The analytical 
challenge, then, is to identify those organizational structures that determine the 
influence of external pressure. 
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We posit that contractual incompleteness is a key organizational characteristic 
conditioning the degree of EU influence. It is increasingly recognized that 
international organizations vary in their ability to adapt to changing circumstances, 
including pressures of diffusion. Not all international organizations are, as 
International Relations scholars widely assume, ‘notoriously resistant to reform or 
redirection’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 2). Instead, some of them regularly 
engage in institutional change. We argue that such variance is a function of the degree 
of completeness of the contracts upon which they are based. The existence of any 
international organization rests upon a contract in which states voluntarily agree to 
bind themselves to a set of formal rules to facilitate cooperation. While all such 
contracts are incomplete to some degree, they nevertheless vary in the extent to which 
they contain open-ended commitments. At one extreme, founding contracts are fixed 
– with cooperation being specifically geared towards achieving some pre-defined and 
concrete result, such as establishing a free trade area. At the other extreme, contracts 
are open-ended in that the ultimate intended result of cooperation is only vague and 
ill-defined. In this case, cooperation is intended to evolve over time in ways that 
cannot be conceived of from the outset; the process of cooperation has intrinsic value 
because the result is largely indeterminate.  
Consider two contrasting examples: NAFTA approximates a fixed contract. 
The final goal of the cooperation ‘process’ is to create a free trade area with a pre-
defined scope that entails mainly free trade in goods, services and investment. Once 
this is achieved, the organization will have fulfilled its purpose; NAFTA is not 
intended to be an organization that develops further thereafter. The Andean 
Community (CAN), in contrast, rests on an open-ended contract behind which the 
ultimate ambition is to create a ‘homogenous society’ in the Andes. This is an ill-
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defined purpose that is impossible, and unfeasible, to define in terms of the steps 
needing to be taken to that end from the very outset. The process is, in this case, thus 
expected to evolve over time. 
Our understanding of contractual incompleteness as open-ended commitments 
thereby differs from the more conventional understanding, which captures the extent 
to which contracts ‘specify the full array of responsibilities and obligations of the 
contracting parties, as well as anticipate every future contingency that may arise 
throughout the course of the exchange relationship’ (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009: 8). 
This conventional understanding refers to the specificity of commitments in ‘existing’ 
policy areas. Crucially, these two contractual characteristics do not necessarily co-
vary. Even organizations based on open-ended commitments initiate cooperation in 
specific policy areas, for which the commitments required might be relatively detailed. 
The founding contract of the OECS, for example, contains open-ended commitments 
regarding the ultimate purpose of the organization, but it also contains specific policy 
ones regarding the creation of a common market – these commitments are rather 
detailed, together encompassing almost 30 pages of text. Importantly, the creation of a 
common market is only seen as an initial step in a longer journey towards ‘closer 
union among the peoples of the East Caribbean’.  
These differences in contractual completeness matter, as a voluminous body of 
literature in Institutional Economics has theorized. Incomplete contracts have the 
virtue of being flexible in the face of exogenous shocks and of being apposite when 
there is uncertainty about the nature of the good or service to be provided. They 
endow participants with an enhanced capacity for adaptation, because they entail 
open-ended commitments that can be adjusted to unforeseen circumstances (Gibbons 
and Henderson, 2012; Hart and Moore, 2008). Such open-ended cooperation projects 
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resemble nation-building processes in their absence of an overarching masterplan. 
The inherent flexibility of incomplete contracts means that institutions, which 
structure cooperation on substantive commitments, tend to evolve as commitments 
change, and thus become specified over time.  
Institutions, in this case, serve not only to lower transaction costs by 
structuring and enforcing cooperation (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Keohane, 1984); 
they also play an important role in ‘discovering’ an evolving process of cooperation 
(Marks et al., 2014). Fixed contracts, on the other hand, are bound to be inherently 
static. Their purpose is precisely to engage in a well-specified range of activities that 
are detailed ex ante. Institutions can, in this context, be designed at the outset, and 
they are less susceptible to external pressure. This leads to a third, conditional 
hypothesis about EU influence: 
Hypothesis 3 (Conditional EU influence): The higher the contractual 
incompleteness of an RIO, the more likely it is that EU influence – both active 
and passive – will lead to stronger regional institutions emerging.  
 
Operationalization of variables and data 
To test our hypotheses, we analyse the process of institution building in 34 RIOs 
from 1950 or the year of their establishment to 2010. We define an RIO in 
conventional terms as a formal international organization composed of three or more 
geographically proximate states having a continuous institutional framework. RIOs, 
then, are conceptually distinct from agreements such as the EU–Mercosur 
Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement, alliances such as the Cairns 
Group and informal arrangements such as ASEAN+3 in their formality. RIOs are 
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based on a written contract formally entered into by their member states, i.e. they 
are designed for a continuous purpose and therefore have a capacity for ongoing 
collective decisionmaking. This involves, at the very least, a permanent and 
independent bureaucracy and a standing decisionmaking body.  
In compiling the sample we consulted the Correlates of War dataset and 
selected organizations that have a distinct physical location or website, a formal 
structure (i.e. a legislative body, executive and administration), at least 50 
permanent staff (based on information in the Yearbook of International 
Organizations), a written constitution or convention, and which have a 
decisionmaking body that meets at least once a year. We identified 34 RIOs 
(including the EU itself) that fit all or all but one of these criteria, including two 
RIOs that no longer exist – COMECON and the first East African Community 
(EAC). The sample, listed in Appendix A, is broadly comprehensive of states and 
continents, and includes all RIOs that have exercised significant authority in the 
years since 1950. 
We see two reasons for limiting the sample to RIOs that have standing in 
international politics. The first is practical. The data requirements for a test of the 
proposed hypotheses would involve evaluating RIOs on the basis of significantly 
more information than was available in any prior dataset; given time and financial 
constraints, it thus makes sense to focus on those RIOs that have left some 
footprints in the primary sources. In most cases they also feature in the secondary 
literature. Hence our decision to exclude IOs that have no website, address or that 
are poorly staffed. Second, while we think our argument might apply broadly, we 
suspect that states – including EU actors – would overall be more likely to pay 
attention to those RIOs that have a baseline level of financial resources available to 
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them.  
 
Dependent variable 
At the heart of this study is the strength of regional institutions, and their evolution 
over time. Our very definition of RIOs eliminates substantial variation in basic 
institutional features. All or almost all of the organizations in our sample have the 
following: an independent secretariat possessing administrative functions; a standing 
body, generally composed of national ministers, that regularly convenes in order to 
adopt secondary legislation; and, some form of executive organ that supervises 
implementation. The vast majority of RIOs also feature some form of dispute 
settlement body, and one comprised of non-state actors such as parliamentarians, 
business representatives and/or NGOs. Whereas these features distinguish, then, RIOs 
from other international institutional frameworks such as agreements, alliances or 
informal arrangements, they are insufficient to capture meaningful variation in 
institutional strength within this group. Therefore, we need to move beyond such 
basic measures of institutionalization to gauge variation in regional institution 
building – and the EU’s specific influence on it.  
One way to do this is to construct a more fine-grained measure of institutional 
design that codes not only the existence/non-existence of important institutional 
actors, but that also seeks to estimate their competences in decisionmaking. Our 
measure focuses on those institutional actors who enjoy some degree of independence 
from member state control, and who thereby characterize ‘supranational’ elements in 
RIOs. Such independence is often conceptualized as delegation, which can be defined 
as ‘a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the 
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latter to act on behalf of the former’ (Hawkins et al., 2006: 7; for an overview of 
relevant concepts, see Hooghe and Marks, 2015). The principals – meaning the 
member states – retain ultimate control, but delegated agents enjoy a degree of 
autonomy which can, and often does, change over time. Delegation is considered to be 
of major theoretical significance, and is widely used in other empirical studies of RIOs, 
preferential trade agreements and global organizations. It is also a hard case for 
assessing EU influence, because delegation entails sovereignty costs. By empowering 
independent agents, member states lose full control of the process of regional 
cooperation; they also enhance the danger of unanticipated consequences occurring, 
due to agency slack.  
The dependent variable Delegation is an additive index of formal delegation in 
decisionmaking processes for each year of a given RIO’s existence (Hooghe et al. 
forthcoming). It measures the extent to which member states empower third parties to 
adjudicate disputes, provide expert information, select or prioritize proposals, and, at 
the authoritative extreme, to propose policy initiatives, make binding decisions and/or 
penalize contract violations. The extent of delegation is a function of a) the 
composition of the organized bodies within a given regional organization (general 
secretariat, assemblies, executives, judicial bodies, consultative bodies) with respect to 
their independence from member state control; b) the authoritative competencies of 
regional bodies in agenda setting, final decisionmaking and adjudication; in c) one or 
more of six possible decision areas: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, 
budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance and policymaking (Appendix B 
provides further detail). The measure assesses the formal rules that can be observed in 
treaties, constitutions, conventions, special statutes, protocols and rules of procedure, 
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which have the distinct advantage that they can be specified independent of actual 
behaviour.  
Figure 1 gives a sense of the sample variation in Delegation, and shows its 
overall evolution (black line) over the period 1950–2010. We see that delegation 
within RIOs has gradually increased over time, with a particularly marked rise coming 
after the end of the Cold War. Concerning variation across RIOs, median values range 
from zero for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Southern 
Africa Customs Union to 0.43 for the second EAC, with the remaining regional 
organizations being distributed fairly evenly in between. Three organizations (Council 
of Europe, EAC, Nordic Council) have a parliamentary body that operates as a non-
state assembly. Four organizations (CEMAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC) have a 
general secretariat with an exclusive right of initiative. Two organizations (CEMAC, 
COMESA) feature a supranational court that provides access to non-state actors, 
passes preliminary rulings and whose rules have direct effect. In the lowest third of the 
dataset are regional organizations as diverse as APEC, the GCC and ALADI. These 
organizations have little more than a weak general secretariat that, at most, draws up 
the budget or has a non-exclusive right to initiate policymaking. Though none of the 
organizations in the sample have achieved the level of delegation reached by the EU, 
some have gradually evolved in this direction – while others remain at low levels 
thereof. 
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Figure 1. Delegation in selected RIOs, 1950–2010. 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Our two key independent variables are active and passive EU influence respectively. 
We operationalize active EU influence through an aggregate index that measures the 
EU’s institutionalized engagement with other RIOs. In the absence of prior measures, 
we construct an index of EU engagement that consists of three components – 
designed to capture the various ways in which active EU influence affects regional 
institution building elsewhere. Appendix C provides further detail on these three 
components, which we describe briefly below. The index is quantitative, and the 
components are normalized and weighted equally in the aggregate index. The 
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.863, which indicates high scalability. We use the index in our 
main statistical analysis because it allows us to capture the distinct logics separately, 
while also enhancing the robustness of our measures. However, we employ its 
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individual components as robustness checks. The expectation is that more intensive 
engagement with the EU will lead to more delegation occurring in RIOs elsewhere. 
The first of the three components is the EU’s financial support to other RIOs, 
which is the main way in which the Community shapes incentives for institutional 
change. EU funding is an ordinal variable (with four categories) that captures the 
amount of funding directed to a specific RIO in a given year, encompassing both 
institutional and project support (x < 1 million €; 1 < x < 4 million €; 4 < x < 8 
million €; x > 8 million €). Funding streams were coded on the basis of a variety of 
official documents, primarily issued by the EU itself, and we augmented this data 
with information from the RIOs themselves. About half of the organizations have not 
received any funding from the EU during their lifespan.  
The second component is EU interregional cooperation agreements, a more 
indirect way by which active EU influence shapes incentives for institutional change. 
Institutionalized cooperation measures the policy scope and obligation of all of the 
EU’s agreements with other RIOs in our dataset based upon the assumption that 
interregional agreements with a wider policy scope and a higher degree of obligation 
are more likely to exert stronger effects of institutional feedback. We assess an 
interregional agreement’s policy scope based on a list of 29 policy areas, one adapted 
from Hooghe and Marks (2015). The binding nature of cooperation is assessed on a 
three-point scale that measures the nature of obligations associated with cooperation 
(non-binding versus binding), as well as the existence of interregional monitoring 
institutions – which forms the highest category of obligation. Our institutionalized 
cooperation score is the sum of the two standardized components of policy scope and 
obligation. We assess a total of 15 agreements that between them involve nine 
different RIOs. 
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The third component is the frequency of institutionalized contact between the 
EU and an RIO, which is widely used as a proxy for opportunities for teaching and 
persuasion in quantitative studies (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007: 712–13). EU contact 
is a count of instances of institutionalized contact between EU representatives and 
their counterparts in a given year across three levels: (1) ministers and heads of state; 
(2) parliamentarians; and, (3) technical experts, including representatives of the 
European Commission. The count assumes a value of three when all three sets of 
actors met in a given year, and zero when none of them met – or when no 
institutionalization of contact took place. Contacts were coded on the basis of a 
variety of documents such as meeting programmes, draft agendas or final 
communiqués of interregional meetings, and augmented by website entries and 
written information elicited by email. The EU has had institutionalized contact with 
22 out of the 34 organizations in our dataset, but their frequency and intensity has 
varied strongly.  
Our second key independent variable is passive EU influence. We expect the 
EU’s own institutional trajectory to affect the degree of delegation in other RIOs. We 
operationalize passive EU influence as the evolution of the level of delegation in the 
EU, coded in the same aforementioned way as we did for other RIOs. With the 
exception of the transition from the European Coal and Steel Community towards the 
European Economic Community in the years following 1957, EU delegation has 
increased over time. This is most markedly true between the Single European Act of 
1986 and the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, after which delegation tapers off. As a 
robustness check, we use an alternative measure of passive EU influence calculated 
by Frank Schimmelfennig on the basis of Börzel’s (2005) conceptualization and 
measurement of the scope of European integration. This captures the involvement of 
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supranational bodies and Council voting rules in EU decisionmaking in a given policy 
area (for details, see Börzel, 2005: 220–221). The two measures are highly correlated 
(0.88). 
Finally, we operationalize the hypothesized scope condition of EU influence: 
namely that it depends on an endogenous capacity for RIO institutional change. In the 
absence of prior measures, we take contractual incompleteness as a trichotomous 
variable that taps the extent to which the commitments that member states engage in 
are open-ended. There are two key dimensions of incompleteness, which we combine 
into a single indicator (see Table 1 below). The first one is the open-endedness of the 
policy scope, which we assess on the basis of the stipulated objectives of cooperation. 
This dimension distinguishes organizations with a concrete and narrow organizational 
objective (fixed) – for example OAPEC, whose principal aim lies in ‘the co-­‐ordination 
and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries’ – from those that 
pursue only a vague and broad-based objective vis-a-vis cooperation (open-ended) – 
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose aim is ‘to consolidate 
multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security 
and stability in the region’ and to ‘facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic 
growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint action on the basis 
of equal partnership’.  
The second key dimension is that of the open-endedness of actor scope, which 
we assess on the basis of whether the treaties emphasize national sovereignty and 
make reference to governments, member states or countries as the only relevant actors. 
It distinguishes state-centred organizations (fixed) from those that provide for the 
potential participation of a wider group of actors in the cooperation process (open-
ended). State-centred organizations achieve cooperation objectives through 
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intergovernmental cooperation, wherein national governments are the only legitimate 
actors. This is reflected in treaties regularly emphasizing national sovereignty and 
making continuous reference to governments, member states or countries as the only 
relevant actors. Organizations with a more open-ended actor scope, in contrast, do not 
have these characteristics. Actors encompass loosely defined representatives of ‘the 
people’, as well as national governments too. Such organizations typically include 
transformational commitments vis-a-vis their societies, which are expressed in 
references made to a ‘union of peoples’, ‘community of peoples’ or ‘ever closer 
union’. 
 
 
Table 1. Measuring contractual incompleteness 
 Policy scope Actor scope 
High Open-ended Open-ended 
Medium Open-ended Fixed 
Low Fixed Fixed 
 
 
At the point in time of their founding, the 34 regional organizations in our 
sample divide in roughly equal parts across the three categories identified in Table 1. 
While an organization can change its degree of contractual incompleteness over time, 
this is quite rare. We code six single interval moves towards greater incompleteness. 
Our analysis, presented below, uses the original contracts for the purpose of this 
investigation. 
 
Control variables 
Our argument about EU influence challenges two other sets of arguments about the 
drivers of regional institution building, ones that we control for in the analysis. First, 
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our argument implies that EU influence is not reducible to other types of external 
influence operating beyond the confines of individual RIOs, including processes of 
institutional diffusion not related to the EU.  
Regional delegation. The diffusion literature suggests that patterns of 
diffusion cluster among neighbouring countries or adjacent regional organizations; 
that is, there is a strong geographic element to diffusion processes (Weyland, 2008). 
This ‘neighbourhood effect’ may result from contact and exchange, the sharing of 
important cultural characteristics and/or membership overlap. In order to capture such 
effects, we measure Regional delegation as the average level of delegation of all 
neighbouring RIOs in the same geographic region (either the Americas, Europe, 
Africa, the Middle East or Asia) – with the exception of the RIO in question itself.  
Global delegation. We also control for genuinely global rather than regional 
diffusion processes. Sociological institutionalists in particular expect RIOs, as a 
distinct category of organization, to become more similar in their institutional 
structure over time due to the emergence of a norm of ‘acceptable’ levels of 
delegation (Powers and Goertz, 2011). We tap into such processes by measuring in a 
given year the average level of delegation in the sample, with again the exception of 
the specific RIO in question.   
Globalization. The ‘New Regionalism’ literature in particular emphasizes 
globalization being a major driver of regionalism in its various forms (for an overview, 
see Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003). As economic, social and political exchanges that 
cross national borders grow, a variety of actors are likely to engage in cooperative 
endeavours in order to manage such interdependencies. The delegation of 
competences to RIOs by state governments might also follow this logic. We divulge 
the impact of Globalization through the widely used KOF Index of Globalization, 
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which captures the economic, social and political connections that countries have with 
the rest of the world (1970–2010) (Dreher 2006). We include an aggregated measure 
based on the RIO mean of each member state’s globalization score for a given year.  
Cold War. Various other developments that we might expect to affect RIO 
delegation cluster at the end of the Cold War, and we introduce a time dummy (0 = 
post-1990) to nullify their potential confounding effects. The end of intense 
ideologically driven bipolar competition created new demands for regional cooperation, 
ones that might be reflected in deeper institutionalization. The end of the Cold War 
also roughly coincides with a stalemate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations under the GATT. As the prospects for continued multilateral trade 
liberalization appeared bleak by the late 1980s, states turned towards regional options 
instead – a development that may have led to (the creation of) institutionally more 
ambitious RIOs.  
Beyond alternative external influences, our argument about EU diffusion 
challenges, above all, explanations that locate the drivers of institution building in 
intraregional dynamics. The structural characteristics of units are typically the null 
hypothesis of diffusion studies. We consider several controls internal to each RIO, 
including the most important explanations for international institutional change in 
general. 
Intraregional trade. Perhaps the most firmly grounded expectation in the 
literature on international institution building is that it should co-vary with economic 
interdependence (Haftel, 2013; Keohane, 1984). Economic exchange develops its 
welfare-improving potential to the fullest with stable, predictable property rights. Hence, 
trade that traverses international borders creates a demand for coordination among 
states so as to provide uniform rules. Reducing barriers to cross-­‐border trade is a core 
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rationale of many RIOs, and one might expect, therefore, that the growth of trade 
interdependence within a regional organization leads to greater delegation. We 
measure trade interdependence, Intra-­‐RIO trade, as a region’s total trade (imports plus 
exports) as a proportion of member countries’ total trade. 
Power asymmetry. Scholars in the tradition of Waltzian neorealism 
hypothesize that powerful states reject strong institutionalization because it inhibits 
unilateral action, and instead prefer intergovernmental arrangements (Abbott and 
Snidal, 2000: 448). Conversely, hegemonic stability theory suggests that an unequal 
distribution of power may expedite the provision of public goods and a hegemon may 
find the rule of law useful in eliciting the compliance of weaker members (Krasner 
1976). We control for these possibilities with a measure of power dispersion, Power 
asymmetry, being the ratio of the material capabilities of the most powerful member 
state to the average of all other members. The Composite Index of National Material 
Capabilities (CINC) Version 4.0 provides a summary measure of military expenditure, 
military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population 
and total population for individual countries (Singer, 1988). 
Members. The extent of delegation within an organization might be sensitive 
to the size of its overall membership base. As the number of members grows, 
decentralized cooperation in the absence of delegated institutions may become more 
costly as a result of issue cycling and increasing informational asymmetry (Hawkins 
et al., 2006; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001: 789). We measure Members as the 
natural log of the absolute number of member states in a given year, assuming that 
the effect of one additional member joining declines as the absolute number increases. 
Democracy. Norms of appropriate behaviour in democratic states, or 
alternatively the political context in newly democratizing countries, may render elites 
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more willing to delegate to international organizations (Grigorescu, 2015). An 
implication of the findings of the democratic peace literature is that autocracies are 
more likely than democracies to be fearful of exploitation. Newly democratizing 
states in particular may use international institutions as external commitment devices 
(Moravcsik, 2000). We measure Democracy as the annual Combined Polity Score in 
the Polity IV dataset. 
Per capita GDP. Finally, we control for the mean per capita GDP of member 
states in an RIO in a given year on the premise that the richer the members, the 
greater the demand for international cooperation – and, correspondingly, the degree of 
delegation to international organizations. Summary statistics and bivariate correlations 
for all variables used in the analysis are contained in Appendix D. 
 
Estimation and results 
We now turn to the empirical testing of our claim that the EU systematically shapes 
processes of institution building in other RIOs. We first discuss issues of model 
specification, before then turning to the results and their robustness. A discussion of 
the control variables follows thereafter.  
 
Model specification   
The dependent variable is the level of delegation in an RIO, expressed as a continuous 
variable ranging from 0 to a theoretical maximum of 1, though the highest value in 
our dataset is 0.452 (achieved by CAN in 2006). As noted, our dataset examines 34 
RIOs between 1950 and 2010. Thus our analysis is of panel data, meaning data that 
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varies across time for a number of entities – that is, RIOs. Since we have only one 
dependent variable, we select linear least-squares regression as our technique. It must 
be noted that RIOs come into being at different times, meaning our data is 
unbalanced; hence we use fixed-effect models with robust standard errors (Greene, 
2008). Meanwhile RIO delegation is lagged by one year, in order to ensure that we 
mitigate any issues that may arise from endogeneity. 
Furthermore, contractual open-endedness is a key variable – it takes two forms. 
It is analysed both on its own and as part of an interaction with active and passive EU 
influence. Contractual open-endedness takes values of 1 (fixed contract), 2 
(intermediate contract) and 3 (open-ended contract). As an interaction term, it serves 
to uncover whether active and passive EU influence vary across RIOs that differ as 
regards their contractual characteristics. The interaction takes the form: 
Y = c + ax1 + bx2 + d(x1 x x2) + SE 
where x1 is the continuous variable active EU influence/passive EU influence, x2 is the 
factor variable contractual open-endedness and d(x1 x x2) is the interaction term. In 
Models 3, 5 and 7 contractual incompleteness is used as a factor variable with a base 
of 1 (indicating, as noted, a fixed contract). 
 
Results   
Results are presented in Table 2 below. The models are: (1) contractual 
incompleteness; (2) active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted with 
contractual incompleteness; (4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence 
interacted with contractual incompleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; and, 
(7) active and passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness. 
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Table 2. EU influence and delegation in regional international organizations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Contractual 
incompleteness 
1.3*** 
(0.266) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Active EU influence  
 
0.848*** 
(0.285) 
0.498*** 
(0.126) 
 
 
 
 
0.67** 
(0.299) 
0.403** 
(0.164) 
 * Intermediate contract  
 
 
 
-0.134 
(1.088) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.037 
(0.293) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
 
 
0.587* 
(0.346) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.463** 
(0.693) 
Passive EU influence  
 
 
 
 
 
6.044*** 
(1.220) 
3.96*** 
(1.287) 
4.785*** 
(1.208) 
3.185** 
(1.366) 
 * Intermediate contract  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.934 
(0.791) 
 
 
0.174 
(0.618) 
 * Open-ended contract  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.323*** 
(0.861) 
 
 
3.752*** 
(0.974) 
Regional delegation -0.308 
(0.191) 
-0.081 
(0.211) 
-0.117 
(0.199) 
-0.151 
(0.245) 
-0.172 
(0.198) 
-0.046 
(0.221) 
-0.158 
(0.194) 
Global delegation 4.881** 
(2.297) 
4.756* 
(2.642) 
1.319 
(2.139) 
0.463 
(2.263) 
-3.135 
(2.094) 
0.428 
(2.226) 
-3.106 
(2.115) 
RIO globalization -0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.01 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Cold War -0.103 
(0.061) 
-0.020 
(0.080) 
-0.086 
(0.053) 
-0.144* 
(0.079) 
-0.029 
(0.046) 
-0.146* 
(0.082) 
-0.034 
(0.042) 
Intra-RIO trade 0.010 
(0.01) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.01 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
Power asymmetry 0.001 
(0.041) 
0.03 
(0.045) 
0.016 
(0.043) 
0.003 
(0.044) 
-0.022 
(0.038) 
0.013 
(0.042) 
-0.011 
(0.037) 
Members 0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.01) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
Democracy 0.029 
(0.023) 
0.036 
(0.034) 
0.024 
(0.024) 
0.037 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.03 
(0.033) 
0.008 
(0.016) 
GDP 0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant -5.58*** 
(0.595) 
-3.26*** 
(0.652) 
-2.92*** 
(0.428) 
-6.1*** 
(0.81) 
-5.33*** 
(0.644) 
-5.5*** 
(0.889) 
-4.91*** 
(0.593) 
R2 – within 0.381 0.324 0.380 0.325 0.489 0.363 0.561 
R2 – between  0.248 0.008 0.019 0.003 0.249 0.003 0.236 
R2 – overall 0.170 0.072 0.106 0.057 0.220 0.092 0.198 
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. 
 
In line with Hypothesis 1, we find robust evidence that active EU influence – 
an aggregate index of funding, interregional agreements and institutionalized contacts 
– is associated with higher levels of delegation in other RIOs. This comes with 
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positive and strongly statistically significant coefficients in Models 2 and 6. These 
results indicate that the EU’s efforts to boost regional institutionalization are 
successful, and do exert an independent effect on delegation. Disaggregating active 
EU influence into its three constituent components and conducting the regression with 
each of the components independently does not affect the results (see Appendix E.1 
for details). 
Passive EU influence, on the other hand, is measured by the EU’s own 
delegation trajectory. Model 4 indicates that higher levels of delegation in other RIOs 
are associated with increases in the EU’s own delegated authority, and this result 
holds true when both active and passive EU influence are included (Model 6). 
On its own, contractual incompleteness is significantly correlated with 
delegation – meaning that organizations based on more open-ended commitments are 
more likely to achieve high levels of delegation. This holds true for organizations 
with highly incomplete contracts when interacted with active and passive EU 
influence. These results are in line with our hypothesis that RIOs possessing an 
endogenous capacity for change are more likely to go through it. 
The effect of active EU influence varies across different types of RIOs, as 
captured by contractual incompleteness. Specifically, active EU influence greatly 
increases in organizations that have an open-ended founding contract – as 
demonstrated by the positive and significant interactions in Models 3 and 7. On 
organizations that restrict the actors of cooperation to governments (intermediate 
contract) – let alone on those with a fixed contract – the EU has very limited influence. 
These results bolster our conditional hypothesis that active EU influence is most 
effective in RIOs that are disposed of an endogenous capacity for institutional change, 
because unspecified commitments provide space for the creation of new institutional 
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mechanisms – as well as the strengthening and reforming of existing mechanisms. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the case-study evidence that has demonstrated EU influence 
on other RIOs concerns organizations with open-ended founding contracts – including 
Mercosur, SADC and the CAN. 
Just as for active EU influence, we find strong support for the idea that 
institutional evolution in the EU is associated with a change in delegation in specific 
types of organizations – namely those based on open-ended contracts. Models 5 and 7 
consistently show a positive and statistically significant effect for the respective 
interaction term. These results thus lend strong support to the conditional hypothesis 
that only organizations with open-ended commitments are responsive to changes in 
the EU’s own delegated authority. Where the ultimate purpose of cooperation is 
clearly defined from the outset, institutional change in an important reference 
organization – in this case, the EU – does not affect an organization’s own level of 
delegation. 
How substantive is the effect of active engagement between the EU and other 
RIOs on delegation? Figure 2 below plots the predicted values of RIO delegation for 
the different values (low, up to the 33rd percentile; medium, between the 33rd and 
66th percentiles; high, between the 66th and 100th percentiles) of our active EU 
influence measure over time, with other variables being held at their mean. Figure 2 
shows that delegation grows faster the more closely the EU engages with other RIOs. 
The most pronounced effect is in RIOs deeply engaged with the EU; this is largely a 
post-Cold War phenomenon. Yet even for RIOs that have medium-level engagement 
with the EU the effect on delegation is noticeable, being statistically distinguishable 
from low or no active engagement from around 1980 onwards.  
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Figure 2. Active EU influence and RIO delegation, 1950–2010 
 
 
This is also the case for passive EU influence. Figure 3 below plots the 
predicted effects of the interaction over time based on Model 5, with other variables 
being held at their mean. It illustrates that EU delegation exerts its strongest impact on 
RIOs with an open-ended founding contract. We interpret this result as evidence that 
the EU serves as an important reference point for learning and emulation processes, 
primarily for those RIOs that are similar to the EU with regard to open-ended 
commitments. Overall, these results lend strong support to the idea that, at least for 
specific types of organization, decisionmaking is indeed interdependent across 
organizations – and even in the absence of active EU influence.  
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Figure 3. Passive EU influence and RIO delegation, 1950–2010 
 
 
Finally, our results also indicate that passive EU influence exerts a larger 
overall substantive effect on RIO delegation than active EU influence does. In 
concrete terms, an increase of one standard deviation in active EU influence leads to a 
0.08 increase in delegation in other RIOs. This is equivalent to the establishment of a 
third-party dispute settlement body consisting of ad hoc arbitrators that, under certain 
conditions, can mandate retaliatory sanctions. A one standard deviation increase in 
passive EU influence, in contrast, is associated with an increase of 0.15 in delegation, 
almost twice as much, which translates into the establishment of a general secretariat 
with executive functions, budgetary competences and a non-exclusive right to set the 
agenda on policy – further to the creation of a parliamentary body with consultative 
functions. As expected, these effects are somewhat larger for RIOs with open-ended 
contracts. Here, a one standard deviation increase in active EU influence increases 
delegation by 0.1 – a value that grows to 0.18 for passive EU influence. However one 
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should keep in mind that the substantive effect of passive influence is spread over the 
entire lifetime of the EU and affects all organizations in our sample, whereas active 
influence targets individual organizations and varies in its intensity. As a result, 
sustained active EU influence can have effects comparable (and additional) to passive 
EU influence in specific organizations – such as in the case of ECOWAS, CAN or 
SADC.  
 
Robustness checks 
A counter-argument may posit that active EU influence is endogenous to delegation, 
because the EU might be interested in dealing with more established and significant 
organizations. In other words, high levels of RIO delegation may attract more 
extensive institutionalized engagement with the EU – rather than active EU influence 
causing an increase in RIO delegation per se. We therefore test for reverse causality 
by running the models of active EU influence with delegation as the independent 
variable, and active EU influence as the dependent variable – also including the 
interaction with contractual incompleteness. The results show that delegation is not a 
significant factor in determining whether the EU actively engages with a specific RIO 
or not (see Appendix E.2 for details both on this and on all subsequent robustness 
tests).   
On the basis of the assumption that channels of EU influence might be more 
informal due to membership overlap, we conducted the analysis while excluding 
European RIOs. However, this does not change the results already presented in Table 
2. We also conducted the analysis using an alternative measure of passive EU 
influence drawn from Börzel’s (2005) study of the level and scope of European 
integration, having been updated by Frank Schimmelfennig for the recent period. This 
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measure is highly correlated to our measure of passive influence (0.88). The results 
hold constant both for the alternative measure alone and in combination with active 
EU influence, but the interaction term loses statistical significance. Finally, there is no 
substantive change in results when we extend the lag on the EU influence variables to 
two or even four years. 
 
Controls  
Finally, we consider the effects of our control variables. We first turn to alternative 
external influences. Regional diffusion appears to have a dampening effect (even 
though insignificant) on levels of delegation among neighbouring organizations in 
five continental macro-regions (the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia), as indicated by the consistently negative sign of the coefficient. This is a stark 
contrast to our finding that the EU’s direct and indirect pressures on RIOs help to 
create stronger regional institutions, being because this EU influence operates against 
the mitigating effect of regional diffusion processes.	  Global delegation is volatile in 
its sign and does not appear to exert any systematic impact on RIO delegation. An 
‘acceptable’ level of delegation appears not to have emerged among RIOs.  
An RIO’s connectedness with the rest of the world (RIO globalization), which 
increased rapidly in tandem with the end of the Cold War, also seems to matter little. 
The sign changes across models, and it is never statistically significant. This is not 
surprising insofar as some of the most globalized RIOs – such as APEC, EFTA and 
NAFTA – have low levels of delegation. Finally, the end of the Cold War had a 
positive influence on delegation in RIOs.4 This might have been due to the end of 
                                                
4 It is negatively signed because it assumes a value of 0 after 1990. 
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general bipolar competition, creating space for more independent RIOs, or 
specifically to the stalemate of multilateral trade negotiations, which led states to 
pursue alternative routes to trade liberalization. The fact that the Cold War dummy 
seldom reaches conventional levels of statistical significance suggests that other 
variables do pick up the ‘end-of-the-Cold War’ effect. 
We also find very limited support for all of the intraregional variables. Power 
asymmetry is not consistently signed, indicating that various configurations of power 
symmetry between members in terms of capabilities have no impact on delegation. 
This challenges the neorealist claim that powerful states are reluctant to cede 
sovereignty. We also find almost no support for the neoliberal-institutionalist claim 
that intraregional trade interdependence affects delegation, confirming a recent 
finding by Haftel (2013). Some of the strongest regional institutions can be found in 
regions, such as Africa and Latin America, where trade interdependence is 
comparatively low.  
There is some support for the rational design claim that more members lead to 
more delegation, confirming a finding by Hooghe and Marks (2015). The coefficients 
are consistently positive (but non-significant), suggesting that the functional pressures 
for delegation in large membership organizations often overcome the threat of 
decisional blockage that increases as the number of members goes up. Finally, there is 
some support for the influence of democracy. The coefficient is consistently positive, 
cautiously supporting the idea that RIOs with more democratic member states tend to 
delegate more extensively; however these results are driven mainly by European RIOs. 
Finally, per capita GDP is irrelevant as a predictor of RIO delegation. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper we demonstrate statistically the active and passive influence of the 
European Union on the trajectory of institution building in other RIOs, doing so by 
drawing on a new and original dataset that measures variation in the institutional 
design of 34 organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010.  
The findings of our analysis imply that existing theories of regionalism are 
incomplete, specifically because they focus on causal factors internal to a particular 
RIO and thereby neglect the wider contexts in which these organizations emerge and 
evolve. Even though some scholars acknowledge that RIOs change in response to 
external pressures – new regionalism scholars emphasize globalization, realists 
emphasize outside security threats – there is little recognition that institutional choices 
are regularly interdependent between organizations. Further, institutional pioneers 
such as the EU have an incentive to actively shape other organizations in their field 
and, especially when successful, they serve as reference points by providing 
institutional designs that others can learn from and emulate.  
This might be one reason why integration theories developed in the European 
context do not travel well. In the 1970s neofunctionalists abandoned their endeavours 
to develop a general theory of regional integration, while liberal 
intergovernmentalism has barely been applied outside of Europe. Explanations for 
institutional innovations differ fundamentally from those for subsequent institutional 
adoption in diffusion research. Whereas the former tend to reflect the structural 
conditions of an organization – in other words, functional explanations are often 
pertinent –, subsequent adoptions are often the result of diffusion – with endogenous 
conditions being insufficient explanations for a given institutional design (Finnemore, 
1993). Hence the relative weight of internal and external factors in the explanation of 
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institutional evolution shifts over time towards the latter, as institutional innovators 
become active proponents of their institutional design and an organizational field 
becomes structured. Existing theories of regionalism have largely neglected this 
insight. 
Beyond theories of regionalism, our analysis also has implications for the 
quantitative literature on diffusion. The analysis shows that organizational pioneers, 
such as the EU, are important providers of institutional designs for other RIOs – 
thereby answering the seemingly simple question: Where do the diffused institutional 
designs actually come from? Recent quantitative studies of policy and institutional 
diffusion have had a hard time answering this question because they generally 
conceptualize diffusion in terms of horizontal connections between units of analysis 
that are modelled through spatial lags, sometimes in a strictly dyadic set-up. The 
analytical concern therein is with identifying the relevant connections through which 
diffusion occurs (for an overview, see Gilardi, 2012). This approach has been 
powerful in establishing that policymaking is regularly interdependent between 
organizations, and also in identifying the relevant ‘reference groups’ that facilitate 
this diffusion. The current analysis implies, however, that such studies tend to 
misconceive of international diffusion processes as overly decentralized and 
uncoordinated. This paper suggests that institutional diffusion can in fact also be an 
asymmetrical process, even a hierarchical one, in which influence primarily flows 
outwards from important institutional pioneers.  
 Beyond these broad theoretical implications, it is also worth asking whether 
the EU’s influence is likely to remain high for the foreseeable future – specifically in 
view of recent developments such as the Euro crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit. 
Scepticism is warranted, as the EU’s credibility as the most successful RIO has 
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suffered – thus also calling into question the attractiveness of the ‘EU model’. 
Consequently, EU policymakers’ enthusiasm to export that model may have waned 
too. Nevertheless, as long as the EU continues to provide financial support to regional 
institutions elsewhere and as long as stronger regional institutions serve important 
purposes for regional cooperation – a lesson from the EU experience that remains 
valid – its loss of influence may ultimately be only transitory. The strongest effects on 
EU influence may thus not concern the strength of regional institutions, but instead 
other important issues of regional cooperation that have been more directly affected 
by the various crises. Examples are the scope of membership or the ambition of 
integration objectives; for the foreseeable future, decisive moves towards economic 
and monetary union elsewhere are perhaps less likely. 
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Appendix A: List of regional international organizations (1950-2010) 
  
Acronym1 Name of RIO Years in 
dataset 
CAN Andean Pact/Andean Community of Nations 42 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 20 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 44 
BENELUX Benelux Community 61 
CARICOM Caribbean Community 43 
CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Union 45 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 19 
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 23 
COE Council of Europe 61 
COMESA 
EAC-1 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
East African Community prior to 1977 
29 
10 
EAC-2 East African Community from 1996 onwards 15 
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States 26 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 36 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 51 
EU European Community/European Union 59 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 13 
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 25 
LAIA Latin American Integration Association 51 
LOAS League of Arab States 61 
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South 20 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 17 
NordC Nordic Council 59 
OAPEC 
OAS 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Organization of American States 
43 
60 
AU Organization of African Unity/African Union 48 
OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 43 
PIF Pacific Islands Forum 36 
SAARC 
SACU 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
Southern African Customs Union 
25 
42 
SADC Southern African Development Community 29 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 9 
SELA Latin American Economic System 45 
SICA Central American Integration System 59 
SPC South Pacific Community 61 
 
 
  
                                                
1 Acronyms refer to the most recent incarnation of the organization. 
Appendix B: Coding of dependent variable Delegation 
 
The dependent variable, Delegation, measures delegation by member states to non-state 
bodies in the decision making process for each year of a regional international 
organization's existence. We assess delegation to a) a range of organized bodies 
(general secretariats, consultative bodies, assemblies, executives), b) that are 
primarily or wholly composed of non-member state representatives and that have 
authority over c) agenda setting and final decision making in d) six decision areas: 
accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-
compliance, policy making. Involvement in the final decision is weighted more 
heavily (1) than involvement in agenda setting (0.5). 
 
 
A. Delegation to the general secretariat 
Every RIO in the dataset has a secretariat with infrastructural functions such as 
running the IO’s headquarters, organizing meetings, and maintaining records. 
However, the extent to which the secretariat carries out executive functions, monitors 
compliance, and facilitates member state bargaining varies considerably. In the 
domain of accession, for example, a secretariat may be charged with soliciting or 
vetting candidates, evaluating whether a prospective member meets accession criteria, 
or negotiating the conditions of accession. A general secretariat cannot reasonably be 
expected to be a final decision maker, and so our coding assesses the extent to which 
the secretariat can go beyond the infrastructural functions to be an agenda setter. 
• GS1: Membership accession. Is the secretariat authorized to vet, solicit, or 
negotiate membership of the IO (0, 1)? 
• GS2: Constitutional amendments. Is the secretariat authorized to initiate or 
negotiate constitutional amendments (0, 1)? 
• GS3: Substantive non-compliance. Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal 
proceeding against a member state in non-compliance with IO rules (0, 1)? 
• GS4: Financial non-compliance. Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal 
proceeding against a member state in financial arrears (0, 1)? 
• GS5: Drafting the budget. Is the secretariat authorized to (co-)draft the annual 
budget of the IO (0, 1)? 
• GS6: Policy initiation. Is the secretariat authorized to propose one or more of the 
following: recommendations, resolutions, or declarations; programs or projects; 
laws, regulations, decisions, or directives; protocols or conventions (0, 1)? 
• GS7: Monopoly of policy initiation. Is the role of the secretariat in initiating policy 
a) not mandated; b) mandated by the IO’s founding document and shared with 
other bodies; c) anchored in the IO’s founding document and exclusive (0, 0.5, 1)? 
• GS8: Executive powers. Is the secretariat of the IO authorized to carry out 
executive functions, such as framing multi-year strategic plans, drafting policy, or 
turning general legislation into directives or executive orders (0, 1)? 
• GS9: Monopoly of executive powers. Does the secretariat monopolize these 
powers or does it share them with another body (0, 1)? 
  
GS_Delegation is calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no 
delegation) to 9 (maximum delegation) and rescaled from 0 to 1. 
 
 
B. Delegation to a nonstate Assembly or a nonstate Executive 
Most assemblies are member state bodies, but a handful of regional organizations have 
non-state assemblies wholly or partially composed of directly or indirectly elected 
public officials, representatives of subnational governments, or transnational interest 
groups. To meet our criterion these bodies must be a) formally recognized as an 
assembly in the regional organization’s founding document, and b) endowed with 
some deliberative, legislative, appointment, or control functions. The assembly is a 
supreme body; while it is often involved in determining other RIO bodies, it is itself 
not determined by them. 
Executives are considered non-state if there is a formal arms-length relationship 
between the body and member states. This could be because of the composition of the 
body or because the formal rules governing representation in the body. The condition 
is met if fewer than 100 percent of members are selected by member governments, for 
example, because members are co-appointed by the head of the general secretariat or an 
elected assembly and a member state body; because an international secretariat takes 
up executive functions; or because an independent expert or court body is involved. 
The condition is also met when member state representation is indirect, that is, 
representatives do not receive voting instructions by their government, or they take an 
oath of independence, or they are constitutionally bound to act on behalf of the 
organization’s interest rather than particularistic interests. 
• Membership accession 
! AS1_a, EX1_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate accession (0, 
0.5) ? 
! AS1_b, EX1_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final 
decision on membership  (0, 1)? 
• Constitutional reform 
! AS2_a, EX2_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate amendments (0, 
0.5)? 
! AS2_b, EX2_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final 
decision on constitutional  amendment  (0,  1)? 
• Membership suspension 
! AS3_a, EX3_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate procedures 
against a non-compliant member state (suspension) (0, 0.5)? 
! AS3_b, EX3_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final 
decision on procedures against a non--compliant member state (suspension) 
(0, 1)? 
• Budgetary non compliance 
! AS4_a, EX4_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate (non--‐
technocratic) procedures against a member state in financial arrears 
(budgetary non--‐ compliance)  (0, 0.5)? 
! AS4_b, EX4_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final 
decision on procedures a member state in financial arrears (budgetary non-
compliance) (0, 1)? 
• Budgetary allocation 
! AS5_a, EX5_a: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive draft the budget (0, 
0.5)? 
! AS5_b, EX5_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final 
decision on the budget (0, 1)? 
• Policy making 
! AS6_a, EX6_a: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive play a role in 
initiating policy (0, 0.5)? 
! AS6_b, EX6_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive take the decision on 
policy (0, 1)? 
 
Assembly_role summates scores for these items ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 
(maximal delegation). 
Executive_role summates scores for these items ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 
(maximal delegation). 
 
 
C. Delegation to consultative bodies 
Delegation can be to a standing channel or consultative body composed of non-member 
state representatives where the consultative body a) has some formal status, e.g. it is 
incorporated in the treaty or convention, in a separate protocol, or on the IO’s 
organigram or website as a formal consultative body; b) possesses formal rights of 
consultation on a regular, predictable basis; c) is composed of non-state representatives. 
 
Consultative _role summates the maximum score for consultative body on each of 
these items ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 (maximal delegation). 
 
 
D. Delegation to judicial bodies 
Finally, delegation can be to a judicial body, which refers to the existence of legally 
binding third party adjudication to resolve disputes and enforce compliance to the 
terms of a contract. By disputes about the contract we mean disputes about the 
interpretation of the major treaty, protocol, legal instruments or policy output. These 
can involve disagreements among member states, member states and a non-state body, 
or member states and private parties. 
Judicial delegation is an additive six-point scale. The first five components are adopted 
from James McCall Smith (2000). The sixth dimension was added after consulting 
experts. Each component is scaled from zero to one. 
• Is there automatic right for third‐party review of dispute (0, 0.5, 1)? A regional 
organization scores 1 if a member state can initiate litigation over the objections 
of the party litigated against (automatic right); and 0.5 if access to third party 
dispute settlement depends on the consent of a political body. 
• Is the composition of the tribunal ad hoc or standing (0, 0.5, 1)? Regional 
organizations with a standing tribunal score 1; ad hoc tribunals score 0.5. 
• Are rulings binding, conditionally binding or nonbinding (0, 0.5, 1)? Our 
assessment is based on explicit language in the treaty, convention or protocol that 
sets up the dispute settlement mechanism. Conditional bindingness is applicable 
when: a) a state consents ex ante to bindingness; b) or a state can register a 
derogation or exception; c) or a decision requires post hoc approval by a political 
body. 
• Do non-state actors have access to dispute settlement (0, 1)? Under non-state actors 
are understood third-party international organizations, parliaments, trade, business 
or public interest groups, or individuals. Access means they can take a member 
state or a body of the regional organization to court for violation of rights that 
evolve from the contract. 
• Can a remedy be imposed (0, 0.5, 1)? Regional organizations score 1 if rulings 
take direct effect, that is, they bind domestic courts to act; they score 0.5 if states 
are authorized to take retaliatory sanctions. 
• Is there a preliminary ruling system (0, 0.5, 1)? Regional organizations score 1 if 
preliminary rulings are compulsory, that is, domestic courts must refer cases of 
potential conflict between national and supranational law to the supranational court 
or must abide by supranational rulings; and 0.5 if preliminary rulings are optional. 
 
Delegation is an additive scale whereby each of the delegation components counts 
equally. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81 which indicates relatively high scalability. 
 
  
Appendix C: Coding of independent variable Active EU influence 
 
• Component 1: Funding 
The first component is the EU’s financial support to other RIOs, which is the main 
way in which the Community shapes incentives for institutional change. EU funding 
is an ordinal variable (with four categories) that captures the amount of funding 
directed to a specific RIO in a given year, encompassing both institutional and project 
support (x < 1 million €; 1 < x < 4 million €; 4 < x < 8 million €; x > 8 million €). 
Funding streams were coded on the basis of a variety of official documents, primarily 
issued by the EU itself such as regional strategy papers, interregional funding 
agreements etc. We augmented this data with information from the RIOs themselves, 
for example in the form of press statements, website entries or meeting records that 
document significant EU funding streams.  
About half of the organizations have not received any funding from the EU 
during their lifespan, including the Pacific Island Forum, The European Free Trade 
Association, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, the Latin American 
Integration Association, COMECON and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Among the most heavily funded organizations are the Council of Europe, Mercosur, 
the Andean Community, and the Southern African Development Community. 
 
• Component 2: Interregional agreements 
The second component is EU interregional cooperation agreements, a more indirect 
way by which active EU influence shapes incentives for institutional change. 
Institutionalized cooperation measures the policy scope and obligation of all of the 
EU’s agreements with other RIOs in our dataset based upon the assumption that 
interregional agreements with a wider policy scope and a higher degree of obligation 
are more likely to exert effects of institutional feedback. We assess an interregional 
agreement’s policy scope based on a list of 29 policy areas. This list was adapted 
from a classification scheme used by Hooghe and Marks (2015) to account for the 
specificities of interregional cooperation. We record cooperation in a specific policy 
area when the agreement explicitly codifies substantive cooperation in the main body 
of the agreement. The binding nature of cooperation is assessed on a three-point scale 
that measures the nature of obligations associated with cooperation (non-binding 
versus binding), as well as the existence of interregional monitoring institutions, 
which forms the highest category of obligation. Our institutionalized cooperation 
score is the sum of the two standardized components of policy scope and obligation.  
We assess a total of 15 agreements that between them involve nine different 
RIOs. This assessment excludes recent Interim Economic Partnership Agreements 
with African sub-regions because they tend to include only a subset of members. At 
the low end of the spectrum are agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council (1989) 
and the Andean Pact (1983), both of which are relatively narrow in scope and involve 
no binding commitments. At the other end of the spectrum are agreements with the 
Central American Integration System (2003) and the African Union (2007), both of 
which involve binding commitments.  
 
 
 
 
• Component 3: Institutionalized contacts 
The third component is the frequency of institutionalized contacts between the EU 
and an RIO. EU contacts is a count of instances of institutionalized contacts between 
EU representatives and their counterparts in a given year across three levels: (1) 
ministers and heads of state; (2) parliamentarians; and, (3) technical experts, including 
representatives of the European Commission. The count assumes a value of three 
when all three sets of actors met in a given year, and zero when none of them met, or 
when no institutionalization of contacts took place. Contacts were coded on the basis 
of a variety of documents such as meeting programs, draft agendas, calendars or 
“history documents” of delegations with specific ROs, joint or final communiqués of 
interregional meetings as well as annual reports. We augmented this data with website 
entries from both sides and elicited further information by email in case there were 
uncertainties about or glaring gaps in the assembled record.  
The EU has had institutionalized contacts with 22 out of the 34 organizations 
in our dataset, but their frequency and intensity has varied strongly. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, interregional meetings between technical experts are the most frequent 
overall, followed by meetings between parliamentarians. In terms of organizations, 
the most frequent contacts are with the European Free Trade Association and the 
African Union. At the other end of the spectrum, the EU has some contact with both 
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting States and the Organization of 
American States, but these are rather low level and much less frequent. 
 
 
  
Appendix D 
 
 
Summary statistics 
 Observations Mean SD Min Max 
RIO delegation 1278 0.134 0.099 0 0.452 
Active EU influence 1278 0.223 0.195 0 1 
Passive EU influence 1278 0.53 0.056 0 0.58 
Passive EU influence (alt) 1278 0.195 0.18 0 0.543 
Contractual incompleteness 1278 2.082 0.734 1 3 
Regional delegation 1269 0.132 0.065 0 0.325 
Global delegation 1278 0.127 0.043 0.025 0.217 
Cold War 1278 0.517 0.499 0 1 
RIO globalization 993 49.241 14.723 22.429 90.156 
Intra-RIO trade 1066 14.370 16.559 0 72.12 
Power asymmetry 1272 4.875 4.196 1 22.927 
Members 1278 12.129 10.5 3 52 
Democracy 1264 13.297 6.198 1.333 21 
GDP 1272 7934.7 9643.04 185.7 59922.96 
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RIO delegation 1.0000             
Active EU influence 0.3569 1.0000            
Passive EU influence 0.2408 0.3151 1.0000           
Contractual incompleteness 0.4043 0.4011 0.0405 1.0000          
Democracy 0.2456 0.1437 0.1395 -0.0618 1.0000         
Intra-RIO trade -0.0055 -0.0053 0.0938 0.0232 0.2991 1.0000        
GDP 0.0170 0.0041 0.1506 -0.0779 0.1148 0.0431 1.0000       
Power asymmetry 0.0255 -0.1831 0.0284 -0.0260 0.0026 0.3822 -0.0826 1.0000      
Members 0.0541 -0.1386 -0.0088 0.1555 -0.1465 0.3556 -0.1025 0.6412 1.0000     
Regional delegation -0.0286 -0.0365 -0.0085 -0.0052 -0.0202 0.0033 -0.0517 0.0187 0.0173 1.0000    
Global delegation 0.0996 0.1112 0.4428 0.0235 0.0828 0.0639 0.1297 0.0107 -0.0063 -0.0279 1.0000   
Cold War -0.1897 -0.2796 -0.8126 -0.0565 -0.1556 -0.0899 -0.0924 -0.0221 0.0051 -0.0240 -0.4360 1.0000  
Globalization 0.0381 0.0310 0.0422 0.0369 -0.0059 0.0351 0.1595 -0.0077 -0.0139 0.0415 0.0596 -0.1438 1.0000 
 
Appendix E.1: EU influence and delegation in regional international 
organizations, Including individual components of active EU influence variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EU contacts 0.245*** 
(0.083) 
 
 
 
 
EU funding  
 
0.128** 
(0.060) 
 
 
Agreements  
 
 
 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Regional delegation -0.122 
(0.232) 
-0.250 
(0.233) 
-0.196 
(0.225) 
Cold War -0.065 
(0.084) 
-0.085 
(0.084) 
-0.061 
(0.079) 
Intra-RIO trade 0.014 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
Power asymmetry 0.039 
(0.048) 
0.041 
(0.046) 
0.034 
(0.050) 
Members 0.013 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
RO globalization -0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
Democracy 0.040 
(0.033) 
0.038 
(0.035) 
0.042 
(0.034) 
GDP 0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Global delegation -0.929 
(1.707) 
-1.476 
(1.562) 
-1.427 
(1.513) 
Constant -3.582*** 
(0.639) 
-3.049*** 
(0.725) 
-3.281*** 
(0.664) 
R2 - within 0.294 0.302 0.285 
R2 - between  0.000 0.002 0.001 
R2 - overall 0.041 0.061 0.043 
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01;
Appendix E.2: Determinants of active and passive EU influence, Robustness 
check to control for reverse causality 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Contractual 
incompleteness 
0.000 
(0.011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIO delegation  
 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
 
 
 
 
 * Intermediate contract  
 
 
 
0.009 
(0.008) 
 
 
 
 
 * Open-ended contract  
 
 
 
0.011 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
 
Regional delegation 0.009 
(0.022) 
0.012 
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
-0.031 
(0.022) 
-0.626 
(0.514) 
Global delegation 0.378 
(0.252) 
0.370 
(0.269) 
0.384 
(0.275) 
  
Cold War -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
-2.008*** 
(0.111) 
Intra-RIO trade -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
Power asymmetry -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.125*** 
(0.044) 
Members 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
RIO globalization 0.000 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
EU globalization  
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
Democracy 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.069*** 
(0.021) 
GDP 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Constant -0.011 
(0.021) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.018) 
0.472*** 
(0.017) 
-3.925*** 
(0.401) 
R2 - within 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.495 0.797 
R2 - between  0.047 0.085 0.008 0.000 0.032 
R2 - overall 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.073 0.352 
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01; (1) contractual incompleteness (2) active EU influence (3) active EU influence interacted 
with contractual incompleteness (4) passive EU influence and globalization (5) alternate passive EU 
influence and globalization. 
Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international 
organizations, Robustness check that excludes European RIOs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Contract 1.291*** 
(0.282) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Active EU influence  
 
0.859** 
(0.340) 
0.604** 
(0.262) 
 
 
 
 
0.691* 
(0.351) 
0.496* 
(0.281) 
 * Intermediate contract   
 
 
 
-0.255 
(0.974) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.150 
(0.354) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
 
 
0.489* 
(0.255) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.205** 
(0.585) 
Passive EU influence  
 
 
 
 
 
5.860*** 
(1.293) 
3.266** 
(1.457) 
4.484*** 
(1.217) 
2.874** 
(1.259) 
 * Intermediate contract   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.387 
(0.891) 
 
 
0.502 
(1.243) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.677*** 
(0.982) 
 
 
3.860*** 
(1.056) 
Regional delegation -0.049 
(0.174) 
-0.005 
(0.254) 
-0.143 
(0.199) 
-0.015 
(0.259) 
-0.208 
(0.224) 
-0.006 
(0.254) 
-0.181 
(0.184) 
Global delegation 6.726** 
(2.667) 
6.335** 
(3.038) 
0.647 
(2.376) 
1.743 
(2.801) 
-3.391 
(2.646) 
1.968 
(2.721) 
-4.615 
(2.768) 
RIO globalization -0.005 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Cold War -0.089 
(0.082) 
-0.009 
(0.126) 
-0.101 
(0.085) 
-0.130 
(0.107) 
0.027 
(0.058) 
-0.121 
(0.117) 
0.045 
(0.072) 
Intra-RIO trade 0.021* 
(0.010) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.017* 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Power asymmetry -0.002 
(0.045) 
0.032 
(0.051) 
0.018 
(0.048) 
0.000 
(0.049) 
-0.029 
(0.042) 
0.014 
(0.047) 
-0.016 
(0.042) 
Members 0.017 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
Democracy 0.027 
(0.024) 
0.034 
(0.038) 
0.020 
(0.026) 
0.035 
(0.034) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.037) 
0.005 
(0.017) 
GDP 0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant -5.82*** 
(0.687) 
-3.46*** 
(0.792) 
-3.17*** 
(0.469) 
-6.15*** 
(0.835) 
-5.29*** 
(0.682) 
-5.49*** 
(0.943) 
-5.06*** 
(0.634) 
R2 - within 0.432 0.356 0.427 0.348 0.520 0.385 0.604 
R2 - between  0.212 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.336 0.005 0.334 
R2 - overall 0.206 0.069 0.057 0.042 0.272 0.083 0.283 
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01; (1) contractual incompleteness; (2) active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted 
with contractual incompleteness; (4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence interacted with 
contractual incompleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; (7) active and passive EU influence 
interacted with contractual incompleteness. 
Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international 
organizations, Robustness check with alternative measure of passive EU 
influence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Active EU influence  
 
 
 
0.720** 
(0.281) 
0.627*** 
(0.225) 
 * Intermediate contract  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.183 
(0.878) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
 
 
 
 
0.709*** 
(0.253) 
Passive EU influence (alt) 0.153*** 
(0.045) 
0.134* 
(0.069) 
0.113*** 
(0.040) 
0.087** 
(0.036) 
 * Intermediate contract  
 
0.039 
(0.080) 
 
 
-0.091 
(0.086) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
0.008 
(0.080) 
 
 
0.047 
(0.039) 
Regional delegation -0.221 
(0.239) 
-0.254 
(0.201) 
-0.093 
(0.216) 
-0.164 
(0.175) 
Global delegation 5.618** 
(2.681) 
5.615** 
(2.660) 
4.457 
(2.629) 
-1.839 
(2.354) 
RIO globalization 0.006 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
Cold War -0.239*** 
(0.059) 
-0.244*** 
(0.062) 
-0.207*** 
(0.056) 
-0.107** 
(0.047) 
Intra-RIO trade 0.009 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
Power asymmetry 0.009 
(0.049) 
0.002 
(0.045) 
0.019 
(0.046) 
-0.017 
(0.044) 
Members 0.014 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.014) 
Democracy 0.035 
(0.036) 
0.036 
(0.036) 
0.028 
(0.036) 
0.013 
(0.026) 
GDP -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant -2.413*** 
(0.740) 
-2.405*** 
(0.764) 
-2.634*** 
(0.716) 
-2.522*** 
(0.562) 
R2 - within 0.302 0.305 0.346 0.434 
R2 - between  0.004 0.002 0.003 0.057 
R2 - overall 0.049 0.057 0.086 0.143 
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01; (1) passive EU influence; (2) passive EU influence interacted with contractual 
incompleteness; (3) active and passive EU influence; (4) active and passive EU influence interacted 
with contractual incompleteness. 
  
Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international 
organizations, Robustness check with EU influence variables lagged by two years 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Contractual 
incompleteness 
1.204*** 
(0.216) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Active EU influence  
 
0.769*** 
(0.262) 
0.536*** 
(0.121) 
 
 
 
 
0.591** 
(0.274) 
0.481*** 
(0.172) 
 * Intermediate contract  
 
 
 
-0.197 
(1.058) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.134 
(0.311) 
 * Open-ended contract  
 
 
 
0.610* 
(0.346) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.368* 
(0.799) 
Passive EU influence  
 
 
 
 
 
5.855*** 
(1.200) 
3.969*** 
(1.333) 
4.740*** 
(1.185) 
3.015** 
(1.440) 
 * Intermediate contract  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.383 
(0.835) 
 
 
0.688 
(0.750) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.921*** 
(0.868) 
 
 
4.438*** 
(1.022) 
Regional delegation -0.373* 
(0.203) 
-0.139 
(0.210) 
-0.071 
(0.209) 
-0.199 
(0.238) 
-0.257 
(0.197) 
-0.105 
(0.219) 
-0.219 
(0.179) 
Global delegation 2.481 
(2.085) 
2.182 
(2.581) 
1.938 
(2.469) 
-2.116 
(1.995) 
-2.506 
(2.388) 
-2.049 
(2.007) 
-2.133 
(2.490) 
RIO globalization -0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
Cold War -0.099 
(0.065) 
-0.027 
(0.084) 
-0.061 
(0.063) 
-0.132 
(0.085) 
-0.066 
(0.048) 
-0.134 
(0.087) 
-0.072 
(0.047) 
Intra-RIO trade 0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Power asymmetry 0.007 
(0.039) 
0.037 
(0.041) 
0.022 
(0.043) 
0.010 
(0.039) 
-0.019 
(0.036) 
0.019 
(0.037) 
-0.010 
(0.033) 
Members 0.016 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
Democracy 0.027 
(0.021) 
0.035 
(0.031) 
0.024 
(0.026) 
0.035 
(0.028) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.029 
(0.030) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
GDP 0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant -5.46*** 
(0.512) 
-3.34*** 
(0.626) 
-2.98*** 
(0.475) 
-6.08*** 
(0.794) 
-5.53*** 
(0.615) 
-5.55*** 
(0.865) 
-5.06*** 
(0.578) 
R2 - within 0.349 0.306 0.374 0.314 0.501 0.343 0.575 
R2 - between  0.195 0.001 0.028 0.006 0.263 0.000 0.250 
R2 - overall 0.143 0.047 0.118 0.042 0.220 0.062 0.201 
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01; (1) contractual incompleteness; (2) active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted 
with contractual incompleteness; (4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence interacted with 
contractual incompleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; (7) active and passive EU influence 
interacted with contractual incompleteness. 
Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international 
organizations, Robustness check with EU influence variables lagged by four 
years 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Contractual 
incompleteness 
1.068*** 
(0.112) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Active EU influence  
 
0.662*** 
(0.222) 
0.511*** 
(0.118) 
 
 
 
 
0.460* 
(0.234) 
0.425** 
(0.182) 
 * Intermediate contract   
 
 
 
-0.125 
(0.989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.162 
(0.327) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
 
 
0.525 
(0.350) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.475 
(0.878) 
Passive EU influence  
 
 
 
 
 
6.070*** 
(1.478) 
4.210*** 
(1.309) 
5.172*** 
(1.536) 
3.342** 
(1.425) 
 * Intermediate contract   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.128 
(0.816) 
 
 
0.444 
(0.826) 
 * Open-ended contract   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.456*** 
(0.872) 
 
 
4.104*** 
(1.086) 
Regional delegation 0.076 
(0.496) 
0.292 
(0.482) 
-0.088 
(0.203) 
0.251 
(0.466) 
-0.258 
(0.195) 
0.324 
(0.457) 
-0.234 
(0.176) 
Global delegation 0.988 
(1.433) 
1.905 
(2.433) 
4.589* 
(2.634) 
-3.009* 
(1.628) 
-0.008 
(2.411) 
-2.887* 
(1.545) 
0.060 
(2.128) 
RIO globalization -0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
Cold War -0.128* 
(0.069) 
-0.060 
(0.082) 
-0.043 
(0.074) 
-0.113 
(0.101) 
-0.089 
(0.059) 
-0.113 
(0.103) 
-0.094 
(0.060) 
Intra-RIO trade 0.010 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Power asymmetry 0.009 
(0.034) 
0.033 
(0.032) 
0.029 
(0.043) 
0.006 
(0.028) 
-0.010 
(0.034) 
0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.002 
(0.031) 
Members 0.017 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
Democracy 0.028 
(0.017) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.028 
(0.027) 
0.032 
(0.020) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
GDP 0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant -5.13*** 
(0.303) 
-3.22*** 
(0.526) 
-3.08*** 
(0.533) 
-6.06*** 
(0.913) 
-5.6*** 
(0.628) 
-5.65*** 
(0.981) 
-5.21*** 
(0.617) 
R2 - within 0.285 0.263 0.339 0.289 0.453 0.305 0.522 
R2 - between  0.178 0.010 0.027 0.001 0.240 0.003 0.224 
R2 - overall 0.130 0.066 0.111 0.077 0.209 0.098 0.183 
Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01; (1) contractual incompleteness; (2) active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted 
with contractual incompleteness; (4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence interacted with 
contractual incompleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; (7) active and passive EU influence 
interacted with contractual incompleteness. 
 
